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Introduction
In the Atlantic Monthly in 1993, Robert Kaplan wrote of what he saw as
Syria’s “…day of reckoning…” when Hafiz al-Assad would exit from Syria’s
political scene and the ramifications it would entail for the country’s existence.
Claiming that the country “…has yet to come to terms with the problems of [its]
post-Ottoman boundaries…,” Kaplan was sure that, once the late President Hafez
al-Assad, the ‘Alawi military strongman who “… has so far prevented the
Balkanization of his country…” left Syria’s political scene, Syria would collapse.1
Yet more than ten years have passed since Assad died in 2000 and his son Bashar
succeeded him, and Kaplan’s belief that Ba’athist ‘Alawite military rule in Syria
would die with the elder Assad has not materialized. It must seem strange to
Western observers of Syrian politics that, in a region so beset by religious and
ethnic strife, a traditionally marginalized religious minority group such as the
‘Alawi can exert control for so long over a majority Sunni Arab country. But the
story of the Assads should not be surprising, for the elder Assad was not only
President of Syria, but a leader of Arab resistance to perceived Western and
Zionist aggression. Feeding off anger over the failure of the country’s early
democratic experiment and the belief that the dream of a “Great Syria” had been
thwarted by Western machinations and neighboring “imperialist” Arab
monarchies, Assad and the ‘Alawi dominated military, formed during the French
mandate, were eventually able to take complete control of the state.
A Single Country
One can only understand how an ‘Alawi army colonel, born to peasants,
could rule his country longer than all of his post-independence predecessors
combined by understanding the unique concoction of ideological movements and
ideals that led to the creation of the Syrian military state. 2 Even before Assad,
Syrian politics had been defined by militaristic paternalism, secularism, and
competition between the Damascene elite and the unheard “other,” made up of
rural farmers, religious and ethnic minorities and the urban poor. Cycles of
ineffective civilian rule followed by military intervention, dressed up in populist
language, gradually eroded the civilian base of power. If the Assads are unique, it
is only in their longevity. Early dissatisfaction with the country’s democratic
leadership was only compounded by events abroad, such as the emergence of an
1
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independent Lebanon and military defeat after defeat at the hands of Israel. The a
lack of faith in civilian leadership, which presided over these perceived disasters,
created multiple opportunities for the military to seize power, which they gladly
did whenever the opportunity presented itself. The Ba’ath Party, which was able
to co-opt the nation’s officer corps with its pan-Arab yet nationalistic, antiDamascene yet economically progressive and anti-Western yet secular message,
was able under Assad to create an efficient political machine, even though the
operator was viewed by a substantial portion of his own population as a heretic.
For Syrians, 1946 seemed a welcoming, if uncertain, beginning. The last
French troops had left Syrian soil on April 17, 1946, ending the French Mandate
which had been established in 1920. Syria’s government was the first true
democratically elected one in the region and the first republic in the Arab world.3
The ruling elite in Damascus had united under the banner of the Kutla alWataniya, or “National Bloc,” a group of people of disparate backgrounds and
ideals brought together under one goal, to create a democratic, secular Arab
republic free of any foreign entanglements.4
The greatest challenge the leaders of the new nation faced was the
question of Syria’s place within the Middle East, and indeed, what is meant to be
Syrian. The very question was inevitably irredentist in principle. To many
Syrians, the greatest tragedy of the French occupation was that the bilad al-Sham,
or “Land of Damascus,” was split between several new nations in the region.
Indeed, the provinces that comprised Ottoman Syria before World War I spread
over 300,000 square miles, as compared to the Republic of Syria’s 185,190 square
miles. Most painful was the fact that the coastal cities of Tyre, Sidon, and Tripoli,
Damascus’ traditional sea ports and vital centers of Levantine culture, were
detached from Syria and made part of the Republic of Lebanon. Most Syrians
believed the new nation to be a completely ahistorical and artificial construct of
colonial intrigue. These facts were an embarrassment to Syrians of all classes,
ethnicities and faiths and would have great import for the region as a whole.5
Neighboring Jordan, which gained its independence from Great Britain in March
1946, proclaimed in November of that year that one of the guiding principles of
Jordanian foreign policy was the idea of a “Greater Syria,” which would
presumably be under Hashemite rule. In an interview with the Egyptian
newspaper, al-Ahram, King Abdullah of Jordan laid down a formulation that
would perhaps come to haunt him in later years. “There is neither great nor little
Syria… [But] a single country bounded to the west by the sea, to the north by
Turkey, to the east by Iraq, and to the south by the Hejaz – which constitutes
3
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Syria.”6 No country emerging from the shadow of colonialism could ignore such a
poignant issue, particularly one with as ancient and rich a history as Syria, even if
the cautious politicians in Damascus wished to do so.
“The Land Belongs To Him Who Works It”
By 1949, the country’s experiment with democracy had already come to a
tragic end. On December 19, 1949, Colonel Abid al-Shishakli carried out the third
and final coup Syria was to experience that year.7 Obstinately trying to prevent
Syria’s merger with Hashemite Iraq, Shishakli sounded what was perhaps the first
shot of the countryside’s rebellion against the Damascene elite. In his first address
to the nation, Syria’s new leader proclaimed that the coup had been necessary
because “…professional politicians…” were threatening “…the security of the
army, the structure of the state and the republican army.” By framing his actions
in the language of national sovereignty, Shishakli gave voice to a current within
the army and within a large part of the population. They believed that popular
sovereignty is not synonymous with Western style liberalism and that many of the
elite in Damascus were strangers within their own land, holdovers from the
French occupation. 8 Hence came the second challenge that would bedevil all
future Syrian rulers; Syria is a culturally, geographically, religiously and
ethnically heterogeneous country, and any attempt by one faction to centralize
power will inevitably result in a backlash from the others. As the socialist
agitator, Akram al-Hawrani said, “…the land belongs to him who works it,” a
sentiment that Syrians of all classes would echo when faced with perceived
encroachment on “their” rights.9 However, as a new state desperately in need of
economic reform and modernization, the necessity of the centralization of
political and economic power in Syria was apparent to all. Shishakli paved the
way for future military officers to intervene in Syrian politics, which they would
henceforth do regularly. However, it was not be until the elder Assad ascended to
power that the country came to possess the political stability so lacking since
independence. The structures which allowed him to exercise control had been put
in place by the French, the country’s last true rulers.
Under the French Mandate, Syria experienced a degree of centralized
control unknown during Ottoman times. However, the bifurcated nature of the
French administrative authority, and their policy regarding the treatment of
minorities within the mandates would greatly affect Syria’s future. The chief
6
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colonial officer for both Syria and Lebanon was a French Foreign Service
bureaucrat called the “High Commissioner for Syria and Lebanon” stationed in
Beirut, who exercised two important powers which gave him almost unlimited
control over the two Mandates. He enjoyed veto powers over anything that the
Secretary-General, or governor of Syria, did, the most important being the
appointment of provincial governors. Secondly, he controlled the administration
of the services called the Common Interests, such as Customs and the Postal and
Telegraph services, which were extremely important for revenue and patronage.
Therefore, even though the Mandate governments, whose chief officials were
chosen by the civilian government in France, theoretically exercised internal
control, the French Foreign Service had final say over matters within Syria.10 This
system of highly arbitrary shared powers would carry on into the independent
republic and heighten the likelihood for conflict between the country’s executive
and legislative branches.
For the legislative branch in most countries, patronage becomes a standard
part of electoral politics and coalition and party building. Yet in a country like
Syria, where political parties existed as little more than vehicles for an
individual’s ambitions, political leaders enjoyed little popular legitimacy and
support. When Syria had its first general election in July 1947, the two main
political parties, both breakaway factions of the National Bloc, were made up of
religious and economic interests in Damascus, who differed on only one issue; alHizb al-Watani, or “The Party of the Nation,” sought to ensure the reelection of
President Shukri al-Quwatli, and the Hizb al-Sha’b, or “Party of the People,”
sought to ensure that the president would not be reelected. The National Party was
also seen, to a certain extent, as a front for business leaders in Damascus and
central Syria, while the People’s Party gained more support from business leaders
in smaller cities such as Aleppo and Hama in northern Syria. 11 With such
inconclusive platforms came inconclusive results; the People’s Party, along with a
smattering of small parties and independents allied with them, won a plurality in
parliament, but the National Party controlled the presidency. al-Quwatli would be
reelected a year later. With a series of minority governments or coalitions aligned
with the People’s Party in parliament, it fell to the president to exercise strong
leadership.12
Whether al-Quwatli could have risen to the task, became a merely
hypothetical question after Syria experienced a crushing defeat in the 1948 ArabIsraeli War. With no deep reservoir of popular support for the civilian
10
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government, it was relatively easy for the military, as the only institution which
came out of the war not looking ineffectual, to seize power. It was the only force
within the country which could move without fear of popular reaction. Being able
to couple coercive force with blood-and-soil patriotism, it railed against the
discredited national government of al-Quwatli and the National Party and the
opposition People’s Party, of which a not insignificant number had backed union
with Iraq. 13 It was the failure of civil government in these early years of the
republic which allowed the Ba’ath Party to later consolidate so much control over
the various institutions such as the military and impose one-party rule over the
country.
An Arab Renaissance
Ba’athism, more than merely the political ideology of a single party,
began as a worldview and a perceived system of values that, after adopting panArabism early on, was able to win the loyalty of many in the Syrian army. The
word ba’ath in Arabic loosely means “renaissance,” and was adopted by two
Syrian radicals, the Greek Orthodox Christian Michel ‘Aflaq and the Sunni
Muslim, Salah al-Din Bitar, both Sorbonne-educated schoolteachers in Damascus,
to describe their vision of a haraka, or movement. Proclaiming that their fellow
Arabs had been repressed first by the Ottomans, then by the French, and in
modern times by Arab monarchists and Zionists, ‘Aflaq and Bitar both hoped to
ignite a spark in Syria which would eventually engulf the whole of the Arab
world.14 However, the concept of an Arab renaissance had originated with Zaki
al-Arzusi, a Francophile ‘Alawite who, like ‘Aflaq and Bitar, was a schoolteacher
educated in the Sorbonne. He became an avid Syrian-Arab nationalist after he saw
his native Antioch province detached from Syria by the Turkish military in 1939
with no objections from the French. 15 Arsuzi’s idea of Arab exceptionalism
remained a key Ba’ath principle, but ‘Aflaq introduced several ideas that made
Ba’athism a more expansive ideology. To ‘Aflaq, the problems that bedeviled the
Arabs, such as tribalism, sectarianism, and the oppression of women, were
introduced by the chaos following the collapse of the Abbasid Caliphate (7501258), and were propagated first by the Ottoman Turks and then by European
colonialists. The solution, as ‘Aflaq put it, could be summed up in three words:
“Unity, Freedom, [and] Socialism.”16 The Arabs, in ‘Aflaq’s view, are one ancient
nation, not separated by state or religion with one “eternal message.” Though
13
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‘Aflaq was a Christian, he believed that the essence of Arabism was expressed in
Islam, which, as a special Arab religion revealed in Arabic to the Arabs, lifted the
Arab people from their previously insignificant place in history to conquer the
Middle East.17
Ba’athism, however, should not be seen as mere Arab chauvinism;
otherwise, it would not have attracted so much support from minority groups such
as the ‘Alawi, who were suspicious of movements that might infringe upon their
traditional culture. It is not hard to understand why ideologies such as panArabism or socialism could hold such appeal to Syria’s Arab religious minorities,
particularly the ‘Alawi. If, in the eyes of your Syrian brothers, everyone is an
Arab and all Arabs share essentially one common culture and philosophy, then the
accusation of being a heretic loses its poignancy. It was a fortuitous intersection
of the legacy of French colonial policy, the failure of the civilian government and
the military’s subsequent intervention in the country’s politics which allowed the
‘Alawis to gain an unprecedented degree of power not only within their country’s
political system, but also within its society generally.
In many developing countries, the military often has served as one of the
only institutions through which the poorest, most persecuted, and most heterodox
elements of society can gain power and influence. This trend could be seen at
work in Syria, for, once a well-to-do male citizen served out his two years of
service, he would be able to make a comfortable living outside of military service.
This left the military as an institution made up of the country’s poorest members,
the majority of whom, including its officers, came from the country’s ethnic and
religious minorities. It is not unsurprising, therefore, that it would have much
different economic and ideological interests than a government dominated by
educated professionals and Sunni and Christian Arabs from the country’s urban
centers. 18 When the French took possession of Syria from the Ottomans, they
found a complacent Arab aristocracy that was not willing to enforce French
imperial control over the “provinces,” nor subvert their own economic interests to
that of their new masters. This meant the French could not rely on the majority
population of the Mandates to rule themselves. Therefore, in those early years, the
main French military presence in Syria and Lebanon was the Armee du Levant, or
“The Army of the Levant,” mostly made up of French Foreign Legionnaires from
North Africa, Madagascar, and Senegal, veterans of the trench warfare of World
War I, who were not welcomed by the locals and who were seen by Arabs as an
affront to their dignity. They also brought the additional problem of excessive
cost. By 1927, the budget of the Mandate of Syria committed 27 percent of its
total annual budget to the home government’s military presence in the Levant, an
17
18
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amount that became intolerable when the Great Depression made its entrance two
years later. Financial concerns were the primary reason why, in 1936, French
Premier Leon Blum negotiated with the Syrians to set the time and conditions for
Syria’s independence.
To escape this financial burden, the French realized that they would need
to raise an indigenous force among the Syrians, one that would be completely
loyal and dependent to their imperial interests.19 The forces of this new Troupes
Speciales du Levant, or the “Syrian Legion,” were raised almost entirely from
rural and poor Sunni Arabs and religious and ethnic minorities such as the
Ismai’lis, ‘Alawis, Circassians, Armenians, Kurds and Druze. Entrance into the
Legion was by examination and both the rank-and-file and officers were trained
by French instructors. As in Ottoman times, the French exempted Arab land
owners from military service. This meant that when Syria became independent,
the new country already had a professional, Westernized military infrastructure,
but one drawn entirely from the country’s lower classes.20
For groups such as the ‘Alawis, the benefits of French rule became
apparent immediately, and not just within the military. French colonial policy in
general was to carve out administrative jurisdictions and districts by religious and
ethnic affiliation. The ‘Alawis, living in the mountainous Jabal Ansariyya region
around the port of Latakia, made up 62 percent of Latakia province, but the land
they lived on was owned mostly by rich merchants in the city of Latakia itself,
which was then 80 percent Sunni, with small minorities of Orthodox Christians
and ‘Alawis. In Ottoman times, as a way to soften their resistance to Turkish rule,
the Sunni and Christian Arabs had been left free to govern the area, including
regulating commerce in the mountains, as long as Turks had the exclusive right to
taxation among the ‘Alawi mountaineers. Sunnis had to promises that the local
‘ulama would not incite violence against or tamper with the heterodox religious
beliefs of the peasantry. The French, however, favored the more loyal ‘Alawis
over the aloof Sunni Muslim and Christian residents.21 All across Syria, minority
groups, formerly content to stay out of the attention of the government to avoid
scrutiny or retribution, now were being integrated into the state’s apparatus.
Though there were initially suspicions from Sunni and Christian Arabs that these
groups might now represent an anti-nationalist “third rail” in Syrian society, these
fears quickly faded with the departing French.22
The lingering influence of the Syrian Legion was noticeable in the postindependence military. Though Shishakli and other generals who carried out the
19
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earliest coups were Sunni Muslims, it is notable that all had served as soldiers
first in the Syrian Legion and that Shishakli himself spoke the language of the
countryside, not of the landed elite in Damascus or the north.23 When Assad and
his fellow ‘Alawi officers brought the country under Ba’ath rule in 1963, it was
merely the logical conclusion to forty years of history.
On September 28, 1961, a right-wing coup carried out by Lieutenant
Colonel ‘Abd al-Karim Nahlawi ended the United Arab Republic, Syria’s shortlived union with Egypt, and supposedly returned the government to civilian
control. Many young minority and pan-Arab officers within the military, several
of whom had trained in Egypt and hoped for the union to bring the Ba’ath, as
Nasser’s main supporters in Syria, to a place of higher authority, were forced out
of the military for their “radical” sympathies. Though enraged at Nahlawi’s
“reactionary” coup, Ba’ath officers like Assad, however, were also bitter was that
‘Aflaq, as ‘amid, or secretary general of the international Ba’ath council, did not
protest the coup or push for reunion with Egypt. Instead, he choose to
compromise with the new government.24 Assad, along with two fellow ‘Alawi
and two Ismai’li Ba’ath colonels, had formed a “Military Committee” in 1960 as a
possible arm of Ba’ath power in the military. But after Assad had been
temporarily relieved from his post in the Syrian Air Force for suspected pan-Arab
leanings, he and five officers turned the Committee into what became an official
opposition group within the Ba’ath.25 When the five members carried out a coup
on March 8, 1963, the newly renamed “Regional Ba’ath Council” now controlled
Syria, and though by 1970 only Assad remained, he never let go of power. 26
Though a non-Sunni Muslim had not previously assumed the august title of
President of the Syrian Arab Republic, Assad did so in 1970. Only then did the
disengaged Sunni majority awaken to the fact that they did not completely control
“their” country. 27
Islands Left By the Tide
To conservatives, this “arrogation” of power by an obscure Shi’a group
that was thought of by many of the Muslim ‘ulama as pagans, seemed to be a
well-orchestrated conspiracy against the outwitted majority. Historian Martin
Kramer posed it as a class issue, though in a way that would give succor to the
most paranoid in Syria’s Sunni population: “Once poor peasants, they beat their
23
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ploughshares into swords, first becoming military officers, then using instruments
of war to seize the state.” 28 The irony of this statement is not that,
chronologically, it is incorrect, but that it credits ‘Alawis with ambitions of which
few of them ever dreamed. In September 1920, the French required the people of
the Jabal Ansariyya to classify themselves as ‘Alawiyyun, or “followers of Ali,”
on their census form to distinguish themselves from other Shi’a Muslim sects
living within the region. 29 The ‘Alawis had learned long before that to bring
attention to oneself was to bring scrutiny, and until the French came they
generally managed to avoid confrontation with their neighbors. Thus, much of our
knowledge of their history and beliefs is fragmentary.
Before 1920, the ‘Alawites were most often referred to as Nusayrites, after
their mysterious “founder,” Ibn Nusayr, a supposed 9th century courtier of the
Buyid emirs in Baghad and pupil of the eleventh Shi’a imam, al-Hasan al-‘Askari,
who ‘Alawis claim imparted supposed esoteric knowledge to him. However, the
real founder of ‘Alawism was most likely Ibn Nusayr’s pupil, al-Khasibi, believed
to have lived between the late 9th and mid-10th centuries, who began his career by
propagating Twelver Shi’ism in the suburbs of Baghdad and was tasked by the
Buyids, who were Ismai’li Shi’a, to convert the inhabitants of Byzantine Latakia
to Shi’ism.30 Though the French authorities treated the ‘Alawis as Muslims, the
question for many Shi’a theologians on this issue had been clear for centuries.
They were so despised by many within the Syrian ‘ulama that the prominent 1314th century Syrian theologian, Ibn Taymiyyah, proclaimed them to be more of a
threat to the sanctity of the Islamic faith then the Christians or Tatars and that it
was every pious Muslim’s duty to wage jihad on them.31 The first real historical
record of the ‘Alawis is by Ibn Battuta, who, while traveling through the Jabal
Ansariyya in the 14th century, noticed that the local people, despite appearing to
be Muslim, did not build mosques. In the 19th century, this fact was so
uncomfortable for the Ottoman authorities that, after the ‘Alawis began to draw
attention from French missionaries in Lebanon, who thought the ‘Alawis might be
“lost” or “degenerate” Christians, they began to pressure them to build mosques,
even if they did not use them.32 It was not until 1936 that the ‘Alawi shaykhs, or
chiefs of the clans, proclaimed that no ‘Alawi could claim to be a true ‘Alawi
unless they proclaimed the shahadah, or declaration of faith, along with the other
four Islamic pillars of faith. In other words, no one could be an ‘Alawi and not be
28
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a Muslim.33 The Sunni grand mufti of Jerusalem, Amin al-Husayni, recognized
the proclamation as binding. 34
However, it was not until 1973 that a Shi’a religious figure recognized the
‘Alawis as Muslims, when the Lebanese Imam Musa al-Sadr recognized the
‘Alawis as Twelvers after the ‘Alawi shayks agreed to abide by the Jafari school
of Islamic jurisprudence.35 No members of the Twelver ‘ulama from Qom, Kufa,
or Najaf, however, have done so.36 This is because, in mainstream Twelver Shi’as
eyes, the ‘Alawis are ghulat, or “exaggerators” of the Prophet Muhammad and
members of the ahl al-Bayt, or family of the Prophet. In turn, ‘Alawis consider
other Shi’a to be muqassira, or “those who fall short” by denying the divine status
of Ali and other members of the ahl-al-bayt. 37 ‘Alawis believe in four tenets
which mainstream Sunni and Shi’a believe to be acts of shirk, or idolatry, i.e.
“associating things with god.” These are hulul, the belief that God can become
incarnate within the bodies of the imams; tanasukh, belief in metempsychosis, or
the transmigration and reincarnation of the soul; ibaha, or antinomianism, the
belief that only faith is necessary for salvation; and a belief in a divine triad with
‘Ali as the incarnation of God on earth, Muhammad as his “veil,” or prophet, and
the companion Salman al-Farisi as his “mirror,” or proselytizer.
Other unorthodox beliefs ‘Alawis hold include that the imams of Twelver
Shi’ism, along with Muhammad, Fatima, and other important members of the ahl
al-bayt are also “veils,” that triads similar to the one consisting of ‘Ali,
Muhammad and al-Farisi appear regularly in human history, that souls are
imprisoned in human bodies and will not be released until judgment day, that only
the shaykhs are initiated into the esoteric secrets supposedly imparted by the
imams, so prayer is not obligatory, and is in fact discouraged by some ‘Alawi
officials except in cases of holidays or festivals and a form of Docetism in which
the Battle of Karbala in 680 was a mirage of God and Husayn’s martyrdom was
an illusion.38 ‘Alawis, along with the Ahl-i Haqq in modern Luristan in Iran, are
the only two known ghulat sects that exist today, remnants of a vigorous tradition
stretching back to the time of the caliphate of Ali (656-661), or as journalist
Patrick Seale wrote, “…islands left by a tide that had receded.”39

33
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Tanks Speak
As established before, it is not hard to see why the military and the Ba’ath
Party would be such appealing institutions to ‘Alawites such as Assad. However,
in power, they differed little from previous Syrian military regimes, particularly
that of Shishakli, who had already shown that a determined military leader, using
the language of national unity, could stay in power by pursuing a radical and
ambitious agenda. Assad and the Regional Council used this template to maintain
total control over Syria. Assad himself remarked that “Never in my life have I
been for anarchy, nor will I ever be.” Anarchy, as defined by Assad, was any
attempt to destabilize or delegitimize the national authority of the ruling power.
To Assad, the experience of civilian rule between 1946-1949 and 1961-1963
proved that only absolute military power and one-party rule, as exemplified by
Shishakli, was sufficient to maintain peace. 40 Shishakli responded to the
opposition of the landed gentry by redistributing state lands, settling Bedouin and
making them register for identity cards and giving literate women the suffrage.41
In a similar vein, The Regional Council responded to the 1964 riots by taking
over the collection and distribution of funds for religious property, cutting out a
major source of income that conservative religious families used to support the
Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamic organizations in Syria. In addition, they
extended state ownership over power plants, oil distribution, and cotton
ginneries. 42 Though Assad would not hesitate to use lethal force against the
civilian population when his rule was threatened, as he did in 1982 against the
city of Hama, he made sure to respond in kind to the elites opposing him. In the
case of 1982, he responded to the opposition of Sunni business owners and
‘ulama in the northeast to his regime by imposing tight price controls on business
and reducing the amount of land individuals and corporations could own.43 No
matter how deep the hatred of the ruler in Damascus, as long as that ruler was
able to harness the even deeper mistrust of the aristocracy and use the powers of
the state to combat it, the military state would not be subverted.
Based on our popular preconceptions of the Middle East as a hotbed of
militant religious fundamentalist, theocratic governments and constant internal
strife, one would think that it would be unacceptable to the Syrian population to
be ruled by a family hailing from a historically marginalized religious minority
group heading a party that preaches a socialist, secularist, and pan-Arab ideology
as its creed. Though it is true that the Middle East can be a harsh and unforgiving
40
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battleground of ideologies, it is also true that in the contest of ideas, over the last
half century Syrians have, as a whole, seemed to prefer the comfort of Ba’athist
nationalism to chaos and constant internal instability. Though it would be an
obvious disservice to the complexities of Syrian history to say that the country’s
politics is completely based on a sense of victimization and historical grievance, it
does a greater disservice to ignore the legacy of Ottoman and French imperialism
and the failure of democracy and republicanism to benefit the average Syrian. To
deny the allure of stability and order to a nation residing in a region where such
elements can be fleeting, is to deny not only any real attempt to come to terms
with the reality of the contemporary Middle East, but a great deal of the West’s
own past. As Seale wrote, “Tanks speak a language more forceful than
parliamentarians.”44
Conclusion
But recent events in Syria and the Middle East as a whole raise the
question of whether stability and order are enough for the average Syrian
anymore. More than a year ago today, the city of Deraa in southern Syria rose in
revolt, and since then the protestors of Syria’s Arab Spring have seen some of the
most bloody and violent retaliation of any within the region, and have responded
in kind. The insurgency within Syria has seen large numbers of Syrian military
officers defect to its cause – almost all of them Sunni Arabs – and revolts have
erupted within cities such as Damascus and Homs, where Ba’athist nationalism
has never taken hold. As one Lebanese politician broadly sympathetic towards
Assad noted, "… Syria is heading for civil war, sectarian war… [And the]
Alawites see it as a battle for survival." Many who support the regime like to
compare the situation to the one the elder Assad faced in Hama thirty years ago,
and Westerners would be wise to take the fears of the regime and its supporters
seriously. Having come to power after the country’s failed democratic
experiment, weakened by decades of colonial rule and multiple coups, the
‘Alawis in Syria are under no illusions about their fate should their protector
fall.45
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